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Abstract 
This paper considers Paez et al.’s (2008) article ‘“Remembering” World War II and 
willingness to fight:  Sociocultural factors in the social representation of historical 
warfare across 22 societies.’  Despite the importance of their focus on social 
representations of history and willingness to fight for one’s country, it is argued that 
Paez et al.’s paper features a number of methodological flaws.  Specifically, the way 
in which key variables (historical experience, collective memory and willingness to 
fight for one’s country) are operationalized is especially problematic.  The 
implications of these weaknesses for their conceptual conclusions are discussed 
briefly, as are the more general limitations of statistical analyses of survey data for 
addressing these issues.
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Historical experiences, collective memory and willingness to fight for one’s country:  
Comments on Paez et al. (2008) 
 
Paez et al. (2008) address a topic of great importance – and one that has received 
increasing attention in recent years (e.g.  Liu et al., 2005; Liu & Hilton, 2005; 
Pennebaker et al., 2006) – the social representation of history.  Specifically, they are 
concerned with the social representation of historical warfare, and they present 
analyses of a wealth of cross-cultural data on collective memory, social 
representations of history and willingness to fight for one’s country. 
There is insufficient space in this short commentary to do justice to the 
important work that these authors are doing in directing our attention to the centrality 
of social representations of historical warfare in shaping contemporary understandings 
and behaviours.  Suffice to say, we are in agreement with them that social and cross-
cultural psychologists should pay more attention to such issues.  In addition, it is 
relatively rare to see the willingness of individuals to fight for their countries treated 
as an object of social scientific concern.  All too often social scientists treat the 
association between ‘patriotic’ sentiment and warfare in general (and military service 
in particular) as a given, rather than as a matter for empirical analysis (Gibson & 
Abell, 2004).  That Paez et al. attempt to incorporate these issues into their analysis, 
rather than simply taking them for granted, is an undoubted strength of their paper. 
However, there are other elements of Paez et al.’s paper which we find more 
troublesome.  Our comments are primarily methodological, although these are (as 
ever) difficult to separate from conceptual issues.  Specifically, our commentary will 
focus on some of the key measures used by Paez et al. – those of historical 
experiences in WWII, collective memory, and willingness to fight for one’s country. 
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Historical experiences of World War II 
Paez et al. (2008) cite the estimated World War II death tolls as having been 
derived from Wikipedia, but the precise page(s), and date(s) of access are not 
provided.  These details are crucial as a brief inspection of Wikipedia entries on 
WWII points to a variety of different possible sources, many of which give different 
estimates for the death tolls of the combatant states.  For example, the entry ‘World 
War II casualties’ (2008), current at the time of writing (August 2008), lists the total 
WWII deaths for China as 20,000,000.  However, a cursory browse through past 
versions of the entry reveal that this figure was, for example, listed as 10,000,000 on 
9
th
 November 2006 (World War II casualties, 2006).  Clearly, the precise death tolls 
for any particular combatant state are a matter of historical debate (see e.g. Ellman & 
Maksudov, 1994; Harrison, 2003; Haynes, 2003a, b, in relation to the Soviet Union), 
something which is acknowledged on Wikipedia itself (World War II casualties, 
2008), and Paez et al. are of course careful to point out that they are using ‘estimated’ 
totals.  But the key point here is that Wikipedia, by virtue of its reliance on non-expert 
user-generated content, is both transient and unreliable as an academic source.  Where 
the use of Wikipedia is unavoidable (e.g. when researching the representation of 
particular topics in Wikipedia), careful citation is required.  The archiving system 
employed by Wikipedia means that most previous versions of entries are available to 
view, but there are so many different variations that it is imperative that researchers 
make it clear which version they have used (i.e. by providing a precise URL and date 
of access, as recommended by most citation guides, e.g. American Psychological 
Association, 2007; British Psychological Society, 2004). 
Comments on Paez et al. (2008) 
 
5 
 
Although some glosses on evidence comparing error rates on Wikipedia with 
other, more traditional, reference works have been relatively favourable towards 
Wikipedia (e.g. Giles, 2005
1), the very nature of Wikipedia’s collaborative approach 
to knowledge is its greatest weakness for academic purposes, meaning that caution 
must be exercised in using it as a source.  This is, perhaps, no different from the 
caution one would exercise when consulting more traditional sources, but at the very 
least, it is essential that, as far is possible, citations allow readers to access the precise 
version(s) consulted. 
Another key ‘historical experience’ variable incorporated into Paez et al.’s 
analysis is whether combatant states were victorious or defeated in WWII, or whether 
they were neutral.  In so far as the scoring system used for this variable involved the 
placing of countries with quite different historical experiences into the same category 
(e.g. neutral countries and ‘passive allies’), the extent to which this captures 
‘historical experience’ in any meaningful sense is questionable.2 
 
Collective memory 
Paez et al. assess ‘remembering’, and evaluation, of historical events through a 
single item:  ‘Imagine that you were given [sic3] a seminar in world history.  What 
seven events would you teach as the most important in world history?  How positively 
or negatively do you regard each event?’ (p. 376).  This question seems to be 
problematic insofar as it actually assesses the importance attached to historical events.  
                                                 
1
 It is worth noting, however, that in the study reported by Giles (2005, p. 901), the number of ‘factual 
errors, omissions or misleading statements’ in Wikipedia (162) was over 30% greater than in 
Encyclopaedia Britannica (123). 
2
 In addition, this variable, despite being at a nominal level of measurement, is used in the correlation 
analyses reported in the results section. 
3
 This appears to be a simple typographical error in Paez et al.’s paper, rather than an error in the 
question itself.  In other papers reporting related research, the word ‘given’ is replaced by the 
grammatically correct ‘giving’ (e.g. Liu et al., 2005). 
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There may be good reasons for assuming that, culturally, those events which feature 
most prominently in the collective memory will be those to which the most 
‘importance’ is ascribed (although no justification for this is provided), and Paez et al. 
do introduce this measure by referring to it as ‘Percentage remembering WWI and 
WWII as important historical events’ (p. 376, italics in original).  However, 
subsequent glosses of the measure strip it of even these nuances, referring simply to 
‘recall’ (p. 377; p. 378).  The issue of how being asked to list ‘important’ events 
might affect ‘recall’ of these events is left unexplored, though we might (if we put 
aside our concerns about the use of this variable in the correlational analysis) surmise 
that it may account for the significant correlation reported between ‘being a victorious 
nation … [and] greater WWII recall’ (p. 377).  Thus our interpretation of this finding 
might refer to victorious nations placing greater importance on WWII as a historical 
event, rather than simply reflecting its status as a collective memory which can be 
more easily ‘recalled’. 
Moreover, the extent to which the evaluative stances taken towards historical 
events and processes can be reduced to judgements on a single positive-negative 
dimension is debateable.  Of course, the use of such measures is widespread in 
psychological research, but there is now a well-established critique of this type of 
survey methodology which should serve to draw attention to its limitation for use in 
assessing the representation of complex historical processes.  For example, Condor 
and Abell (2006) found not only different evaluations of the British Empire amongst 
their semi-structured interview respondents in Scotland and England, but at times 
found that it was actually constructed differently by respondents in the two countries.  
As discourse analysts have pointed out (e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987), once we 
confront the accounts of social actors in their own words, it often becomes apparent 
Comments on Paez et al. (2008) 
 
7 
 
that attitude objects (e.g. World War II; the British Empire) are difficult to separate 
from evaluations (e.g. positive-negative).  This is hinted at in passing when Paez et al. 
explain that ‘[i]n some countries, WWII was mentioned by synonyms such as the 
Patriotic War in Russia’ (2008, p. 376).  The term ‘Patriotic War’ itself comes with an 
in-built evaluation (compare the hypothetical alternative ‘Nationalistic War’; and see 
Billig, 1995, on the ideological functions of the terms ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’). 
 
Willingness to fight for one’s country 
Despite the authors’ commendable efforts to explore this variable, the way in 
which it is operationalized can be seen as problematic in several respects.  
‘Willingness to fight for country’ is measured using a single yes/no item:  ‘Of course, 
we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would 
you be willing to fight for your country?’ (p. 377).  The first point worthy of note 
about this item is that it is a leading question – containing as it does a clearly 
evaluative component (‘we all hope that…’) which in its very asking conveys a 
normative expectation of the adoption of an anti-war attitudinal stance as a default 
position.  It might be argued that this represents a form of wording designed to guard 
against socially desirable responding given that ‘fighting’ is generally subject to 
opprobrium, but this would be to treat the status of ‘fighting’ as culturally invariable.  
In contrast, it may be that, in some cultural contexts, it would be socially normative to 
respond that one would indeed be willing to fight for one’s country.  Given that Paez 
et al. are sensitive to the possibility that cultures may differ in terms of power distance 
values, ‘culture of peace’, and so on (see p. 375), it is perhaps surprising that these 
issues were neglected with respect to this measure.  
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Furthermore, the question (and more generally the methodology of collecting 
responses to forced choice questionnaire items) neglects the important issue of the 
cultural meaning of terms such as ‘country’.  The issue of what, precisely, one is 
willing to fight for when one declares a willingness to fight for one’s country, is far 
from straightforward.  Despite a tendency in much of the social psychological 
literature to assume that people within a nation understand terms such as ‘country’ 
and ‘nation’ in a straightforward and unitary manner, recent evidence suggests that 
these, and related terms, may in fact be polyvalent.  For example, Condor (2006, p. 
676) noted that in semi-structured interview accounts collected in England, 
nationhood ‘tended to be formulated either as an entirely de-populated construct (e.g. 
a place or set of institutions) or … as a hybrid collectivity of social and natural 
elements, of people, places and things.’  In the context of discussions of military 
service, also in England, Gibson and Condor (in press) found that the term ‘country’ 
in phrases such as ‘fighting for the country’ or ‘serving the country’ was sometimes 
oriented to as indicating a national people or territory, but that there were also 
occasions on which people treated a willingness to fight for one’s country as 
synonymous with support for the policy of one’s government.  Although these 
findings, unlike those of Paez et al., come from samples drawn from only one 
(national) cultural context, they nevertheless indicate the potential for ‘country’ to be 
treated in potentially quite radically different ways.  By simply asking people about 
their willingness to fight for their ‘country’, then, we may miss the crucial issue of 
how the term ‘country’ is received.  This is not to suggest that people simply 
misunderstood the question, or were not sure what meaning of ‘country’ was implied 
by the question, but that the precise meaning of country (people, territory, institution, 
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or any combination of these) might be better treated as a matter for participants 
themselves, rather than being assumed a priori. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Paez et al. (2008, p. 378) conclude by suggesting that ‘it is event-specific and 
focused symbolic learning, passed by word of mouth and mass media and replayed 
through institutional forms of commemoration and state building, that contributes to a 
culture of war, not a general abstract dimension of hawkish remembrance.’  Precisely 
how these conclusions follow from the results reported is unclear.  It is worth bearing 
in mind that Paez et al. operationalize the ‘general abstract dimension of hawkish 
remembrance’ in terms of the ‘recall’ of World War I, which here stands for ‘wars in 
general’ (p. 378).  However, rather than treating WWI as an index of ‘wars in 
general’, we might instead suggest that its very specificity may be able to account for 
the absence of a correlation with willingness to fight for one’s country and the various 
measures of cultural values employed by Paez et al.  If, as Paez et al. (p.374) point 
out, WWII tends to be represented as a ‘Just War’ in victorious nations, then the 
position of WWI may be much more ambiguous (see e.g. Paris, 2000).  In short, the 
use of any single war to stand for ‘wars in general’, and thereby to treat ‘recall’ of that 
war as indicative of a ‘general abstract dimension of hawkish remembrance’, is 
problematic.  It is therefore difficult to see how the correlations between willingness 
to fight, cultural values and WWII – but not WWI – ‘recall’ lead to these conclusions. 
Moreover, no evidence is presented for the importance of cultural transmission 
through ‘word of mouth and mass media’, nor ‘through institutional forms of 
commemoration and state building’.  Of course, these factors are undoubtedly 
significant, but the implication created of national populations passively accepting the 
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cultural messages relayed through these channels implies a vision of social actors as 
cultural dupes, unable to argue, debate, and discuss the significance and meaning of 
key historical events (cf. Billig, 1987).  Moreover, by virtue of the statistical 
techniques employed, culture is reduced to a mean response which is then implicitly 
generalised to entire national populations, which in effect glosses over the possibility 
of cultural variation within these populations.  This points to a further problem:  the 
tendency to elide the constructs of society, culture, nation and state (Billig, 1995).  It 
is beyond the scope of the present commentary to explore these issues in any depth, 
but, to conclude, it should be incumbent on researchers to be cognizant of such 
matters.  Moreover, for all that Paez et al. should be commended for attempting to 
grapple with these important phenomena, the complex interplay of culture, history 
and social representations surely requires a more subtle set of methodological tools 
than those utilized in their paper. 
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